ABSTRACT Cloud computing is a novel pattern, which can allow users to outsource their data to the cloud servers in order to save the resource of clients. For the sake of protecting the clients' privacy, the clients' data are stored or computed in the encrypted data. This leads to a new issue: how to quickly search these encrypted data. One of the methods to solve the problem is to construct public-key encryption schemes with the equality test. In this paper, we point out that an identity-based encryption scheme with the equality test and a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with equality test is not secure on their security models, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud computing environment, users are allowed to outsource their data to cloud severs. In order to protect the privacy of data of users, these outsourced data have to be stored in an encrypted form. However, in order to efficiently extract some statistical information of the data for users in the future, it is necessary to search some information from the encrypted data in the cloud firstly.
This novel application brings many new security issues, such as auditing [1] , outsourcing computation [2] , [3] , outsourcing verification [4] and encrypted data searching [5] . Boneh et al. [5] introduced a new concept -public key encryption with keyword search (PKEKS), which can search a keyword over the encrypted data but cannot decrypt it. Later, Yang et al. [6] put forward another new concept -public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), which combines the public key encryption (PKE) and searchable encryption (SE). The PKEET cannot only decrypt the encrypted keyword, but also can check if ciphertexts are encryptions of the same unknown keyword even if it is possible to use different public keys. Tang [7] proposed a PKEET with fine-grained authorization scheme (PKEET-FG), an extension of PKEET-FG [8] and all-or-nothing PKEET (AON-PKEET) [9] 
to improve
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Cristina Rottondi. the scheme. Ma et al. [10] presented a PKEET supporting flexible authorization (PKEET-FA). In their scheme there are 4 types of flexible authorizations. In order to simplify the certificate management of PKEET, Ma [11] presented an identity-based encryption with equality test (IBEET), and showed that the scheme was one-way secure under chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA). Also, Lee et al. [12] presented semi-generic construction of IBEET scheme and PKEET scheme, but their constructions need to use the encryption algorithm twice and a one-time signature, which aren't efficient. Zhang and Xu [13] and Zhang et al. [14] proposed two schemes from lattices, which can be considered secure under quantum computing attacks. In order to make the scheme more flexible, Zhu et al. [15] and Wang et al. [16] proposed a key policy attribute based encryption scheme with equality test (KP-ABEET) and ciphertext policy attribute based encryption scheme with equality test (CP-ABEET) respectively and showed their corresponding security. However, Liao et al. [17] showed that the KP-ABEET scheme [15] wasn't secure on their security model.
In this article, we analyze the security of IBEET and CP-ABEET as follows. We firstly prove that the IBEET scheme proposed by Ma isn't one-way under chosen ciphertext attack and then we set forth the reason of insecurity and give some idea to improve the scheme. Next we prove that the CP-ABEET scheme proposed by Wang et al. isn't indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attack in the standard model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we recall basic concepts which will be used in the paper. We then recall an IBEET scheme proposed by Ma and show that the scheme isn't secure based on their security models and improve the scheme in section III. In section IV we recall a CP-ABEET scheme proposed by Wang et al. and show that the scheme isn't IND-CPA secure in the standard model. Finally, we conclude the paper in section V.
II. PRELIMINARY
Here, we first recall some basic mathematical knowledge which will be used.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G and G T be two multiplicative groups which have the same prime order q, Z * q be the multiplicative group of the finite field F q . A bilinear map e : G × G → G T [18] , which satisfies the following three properties:
• Bilinearity: For any u, v, w ∈ G,
e(u, vw) = e(u, v)e(u, w), and e(uv, w) = e(u, w)e(v, w).
• Non-degeneracy: There are elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, such that e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1 G T , where 1 G T is the identity element of G T .
• Computability: For any elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ). Definition 1: Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH problem). Let G 1 and G T be the groups of the same prime order q above. Given (g, g c , g b , g a ) ∈ G 4 for some a, b, c ∈ Z * q , to compute e(g, g) abc . Where g isn't the identity element of G and e : G × G → G T .
Definition 2: Twin-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (t-DBDH problem). Given two distributions
to decide whether abc ≡ d mod q and auv ≡ w mod q hold or not.
B. MODEL OF IBEET AND ABEET
An IBEET and ABEET include three entities, the key generator center (KGC), users and the cloud server, which are described in FIGURE 1. The KGC generates the private key of a user's identity in IBEET and sets of attributes in ABEET, respectively. The users create their trapdoors by using their private keys and ciphertexts. The cloud server stores the users' data (ciphertexts) and runs the test algorithm when it receives the corresponding trapdoors. The users receive their private keys over secure channels and the cloud server gets the ciphertexts and trapdoors over open channels which can be eavesdropped by adversaries.
III. INSECURITY OF AN IBEET SCHEME A. SYNTAX OF IBEET
An IBEET scheme [11] includes six algorithms: Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec, Trapdoor and Test. Let M and C be its plaintext space and ciphertext space, respectively.
• Setup(k): On input a security parameter k, the algorithm outputs public system parameters K and a master key msk.
• Extract(msk, ID): On input msk and an arbitrary identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the algorithm outputs a private key sk ID for an identity ID.
• Enc(ID, M ): On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * and a plaintext M ∈ M, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C.
• Dec(sk ID , C): On input a ciphertext C ∈ C and a private key sk ID , the algorithm outputs a plaintext M ∈ M.
• Trapdoor(sk ID A , C): On input the private key sk ID A of identity ID A of a user A and a ciphertext C ∈ C encrypted some plaintext by using ID A , the algorithm outputs a trapdoor td A . If C is empty string(ciphertext), then that means all ciphertexts correspond to the same trapdoor td A .
• Test(C A , td A , C B , td B ) : On input a ciphertext C A ∈ C, a trapdoor td A for an identity ID A , and a ciphertext C B ∈ C, a trapdoor td B for an identity ID B , the algorithm outputs ''1'' if C A and C B are generated by the same plaintext; Otherwise it outputs ''0''.
B. SECURITY MODEL OF IBEET
We recall the definition of the security concept of oneway against chosen ciphertext security(OW-ID-CCA) for IBEET scheme [11] . GAME 1
• Setup: On input a security parameter k, the challenger C produces the system parameters K by running the Setup algorithm. Then C sends K to the adversary and keeps the master key msk by itself.
• The Phase • Challenge: Firstly the adversary A decides to submit an challenge identity ID * which she/he selects. The only restricted condition is that ID * didn't appear in the private key queries in the phase 1, however ID * may be in the decryption queries (ID * , ·) or in the trapdoor queries. Then the challenger C randomly selects a plaintext M * ∈ M and finally sends the challenge ciphertext
-Private key queries. If ID i = ID * , then the challenger C responds it as that in the phase 1. -Trapdoor queries TD i . For any identity, the challenger C responds it as that in the phase 1.
, then the challenger C responds it as that in the phase 1.
• Guess: A submits a guess M ∈ M. We call an adversary A to be a OW-ID-CCA adversary in the above game [11] . And the advantage of the OW-ID-CCA adversary is the probability that the adversary A wins the game, that is
Definition 3:
We call an IBEET scheme to be OW-ID-CCA secure, if for all OW-ID-CCA adversaries, Adv
is negligible in the security parameter k.
C. RECALL THE Ma's IBEET SCHEME AND ITS SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before we analyse the Ma's IBEET scheme [11] , we firstly recall it.
1) RECALL THE Ma's IBEET SCHEME
The construction of their scheme is as follows.
• Setup: On input a security parameter k, it works as follows: -Produce some public parameters: two multiplicative groups G, G T of prime order p, and an admissible bilinear map e : G × G → G T with a random generator g ∈ G. Randomly select three cryptographic hash functions:
where l 1 and l 2 are length of elements in G and Z p , respectively.
-Select random elements s , s ∈ Z p and let g 1 = g s and g 2 = g s . Here let M ⊂ G be the message space and C ⊂ G 4 × {0, 1} l 1 +l 2 be the ciphertext space. The public system parameters are
• Extract: On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , it works as follows: • Trapdoor: On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , it works as follows: -Firstly calculate h ID = H 1 (ID) ∈ G, then set the trapdoor td ID = h s ID , which is the first element of sk ID .
• Enc: On input a message M ∈ G and an identity ID, it works as follows: -Firstly calculate h ID = H 1 (ID) ∈ G, and randomly pick three elements
where
2 ), and where
• Dec(C, sk ID ): On input ciphertext C and the private key
∈ C is a ciphertext encrypted by using the identity ID, the algorithm firstly calculates
and then it outputs M if the following equalities hold.
Otherwise, it outputs ''⊥ .
• 
and . It firstly computes:
and then it outputs ''1'' if the equation
holds; otherwise it outputs ''0''.
2) INSECURITY OF Ma's SCHEME
Next, we will show that the IBEET scheme doesn't satisfy the above OW-ID-CCA security, which was firstly defined in paper [11] . From the definition of the OW-ID-CCA attack, at any time any adversary can have access to the trapdoor oracle to obtain the trapdoor of any identity including the challenge identity ID * . That is to say, at least the adversary can get td ID * = h s ID * before guess stage in the attack game. When the adversary knows the challenge identity ID * and the
, it conducts as follows.
• When the adversary obtains the challenge (ID * , C * ), she/he checks whether the challenge identity ID * is listed in trapdoor queries or not. It can get td ID * = h s ID * by having access to the trapdoor queries before the guess stage if it is not listed in previous trapdoor queries (A better and easier way to do it is to pick the challenge identity from the list of trapdoor queries in the phase 1. Because the challenge identity is chosen by the adversary.).
• Secondly, the adversary calculates
, and randomly selects r ∈ Z * p to set C 2 = (C * 2 ) r . The adversary checks whether C 2 is a part of a ciphertext having been on the list of decryption queries and encrypted by the identity ID * . If it is on the list of decryption queries, then repeats above step (renew the random number r); otherwise, the adversary calculates
• Thirdly, the adversary modifies the challenge ciphertext C * and continues to perform the chosen ciphertext attack as follows. The adversary firstly sets
with the identity ID * to the decryption queries as a ciphertext. The challenge responds M if the ''ciphertext'' C is a valid ciphertext; otherwise it responds ''⊥ .
• Finally, the adversary outputs M * (= M ) as a plaintext of the challenge ciphertext C * and the challenge identity ID * .
For above attack, the ciphertext C doesn't equal C * , because
When the decryption oracle receives (ID * , C ) as a decryption query, it computes as follows.
Since C * is a valid ciphertext and
We have r 1 = r * 1 and M = M * . And it is obvious that the following two equalities hold.
Thus, the above adversary can successfully get M (= M * ), which is the plaintext of the challenge ciphertext C * . Therefore, the IBEET scheme is not OW-ID-CCA secure.
D. REASON OF INSECURITY
Now, we analyse the IBEET scheme and find out the reason why it is insecure as follows. Firstly, from the construction of the encryption algorithm in the IBEET scheme, it is easy to find out that it encrypts (M , r 1 ) and M r 1 respectively by independently using Boneh and Franklin's identity-based encryption(IBE) scheme [19] . In detail, an encrypter picks a random number r 3 ∈ Z p to encrypt (M , r 1 ) and sets C 4 = g r 3 ,
2 ) as a corresponding ciphertext, and picks a random number r 2 ∈ Z p to encrypt M r 1 and sets
1 ) as a corresponding ciphertext. These two parts can independently be done and set as a ciphertext of M . Thus, it is possible to make an adversary tamper the ciphertext.
Secondly, the IBEET scheme is a special IBE scheme, which needs to delegate the trapdoor to perform the test algorithm in the cloud server. So the value of M r 1 can be known by the adversary after revealing the trapdoor. Thus the adversary can tamper the ciphertext after finding out M r 1 .
Finally, we explain that why the above scheme is not secure but security can have been proved. Because there is an obvious gap between views of two adversaries in the IBEET scheme and ''PUBK'' scheme in [11] , but which was not considered in their paper. Since the adversary in IBEET scheme can obtain trapdoor and calculate M r 1 (= C 4 · ), the adversary can change C 2 (but not necessary to know the exponent of C 2 ) and C 3 to construct a new valid ciphertext. However, the adversary in ''PUBK'' scheme hasn't this capability. Because there does not exist a trapdoor algorithm to delegate the trapdoor information in the scheme. Therefore, the IBEET scheme is not secure, even security of ''PUBK'' scheme can be reduced to BDH problem in paper [11] .
E. FURTHER CONSIDERATION
From the above analysis, we advise to set r 2 = r 3 , that will lead it to be difficult to tamper the ciphertext. Because if we want to construct a new ciphertext from M r 1 , we will know C 5 of the original ciphertext and the input of hash function H 3 in C 5 . However, that needs to solve the hard problem BDH. On the other hand, when we formally prove the security of our idea, we should modify the encryption algorithm in ''PUBK'' scheme such that C 3 = M r 1 . That should be able to make adversaries in the IBEET scheme and ''PUBK'' scheme get the same views. The improvement can be proved by using the idea of Boneh and Franklin [19] . Because we use their scheme to encrypt (M , r 1 ) and M r 1 with the same random element r 2 , respectively.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF A CP-ABEET SCHEME
Here, we first recall the notion of CP-ABEET and its security model. And then we review CP-ABEET scheme proposed by Wang et al. [16] and analyze its security.
A. MODEL OF CP-ABEET AND ITS SECURITY MODEL
A CP-ABEET scheme includes six algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Trapdoor, Dec and Test. The detailed is described as follows.
• Setup. Take a security parameter k as input, and generate a master key MSK and the public parameter Param. And keep MSK secure.
• KeyGen. Take as input the public parameter Param, the master key MSK and an attribute set AL. Generate the secret key SK for the attribute set W .
• Enc. Take as input Param, a plaintext message M and an access structure W . Generate a ciphertext CT .
• Trapdoor. Take as input the public parameter Param, an attribute set AL, an access structure T and MSK , generate the trapdoor TD for users.
• Dec. Take as input the ciphertext CT , the secret key SK , generate the corresponding plaintext M of the ciphertext CT .
• Test. Take as input two ciphertexts CT A , CT B , two trapdoors TD A , TD B , it outputs 1 if the corresponding plaintext of CT A and CT B are the same messages; otherwise, it outputs 0.
Here, we review the definition of the security property defined in Wang et al.'s paper as follows [16] . GAME 2. Let A be an adversary which interacts with a challenger C. A firstly chooses an access structure W which it wishes to be challenged.
(1) Setup. The challenger C takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs the public parameter Param and sends it to A.
(2) Phase 1. A runs the following queries polynomially many times.
• Key retrieve queries: The adversary A runs queries of the private keys of a set of attributes AL for many access structures T i . C sends the corresponding private key SK to A.
• Trapdoor queries: C runs the Trapdoor algorithm and outputs the trapdoor TD and responds to A. Note 1 : The definition in the paper [16] required that the challenger C could answer the key retrieve queries for AL of any access structure. That definition is too strong such that there is no scheme satisfying that definition. Because if the adversary can obtain the secret key of AL satisfying the challenge access structure W , then it can decrypt the challenge ciphertext CT * , and it can win the game with probability 1.
B. RECALL THE CP-ABEET SCHEME AND ITS SECURITY ANALYSIS
We recall the CP-ABEET scheme proposed by Wang et al. [16] . Wang et al. had shown that their scheme satisfies IND-CPA security. However, we will show that this security property doesn't hold.
1) RECALL THE CP-ABEET SCHEME
• Setup(1 k ) : On input a security parameter k, produce
Param and the master key MSK as follows.
-Generate two bilinear groups G, G T with the same prime order p, and generate a random generator g ∈ G.
A map e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map.
Where N is the number of system attributes. -Randomly choose α, α , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ∈ Z p and W 1 , W 2 ∈ G and calculate
H 1 , H 2 ) and keep the master key MSK = (α, α , r 1 , k=0 a ω k . This algorithm creates the cipheretext CT as follows.
-Randomly pick z, z 1 , z 2 , ∈ Z p and calculate
• KeyGen ( -Select a random element s ∈ Z p , calculate s 1 = γ 1 + s, s 2 = γ 2 + s, s 3 = γ 3 + s and generate the decryption secret key as follows.
where sk 3,i = W • Dec(CT , SK , S, S ): On input the ciphertext CT and the decryption secret key SK , compute the plaintext as follows.
Here all a k above are coefficients in the unfolding polynomial and if e(Q B , C 3,A ) = e(Q A , C 3,B ) it outputs 1; Otherwise, it outputs 0.
2) THE CP-ABEET SCHEME ISN'T SECURE FOR IND-CPA
Now, we analyze the IND-CPA security of the CP-ABEET scheme.
From the definition of GAME 2, we know that any adversary A selects the challenge messages M 0 and M 1 and obtains the challenge ciphertext CT * which is a ciphertext of M 0 or M 1 . Next, the adversary A continues to make trapdoor query get the trapdoor TD of the attribute set AL satisfying the access structure W . This is important to our attack. The adversary uses TD and CT * to compute
and
.
Then, the adversary verifies the following equality.
If the equality holds, the adversary outputs M 0 ; otherwise, it outputs M 1 . Obviously, if the challenge ciphertext CT * is a valid ciphertext and the trapdoor TD is valid, then the value of V is correct and such that
Thus, the equality e(
Thus, the attack can show that the CP-ABEET scheme isn't IND-CPA secure.
C. BRIEF SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
Wang et al. wanted to construct a CP-ABEET scheme which is IND-CPA secure without random oracle. However, they omitted the adversary can access to the trapdoor oracle to get the trapdoor of any attribute set, which can be used to the Test algorithm. Furthermore, the adversary can choose a message M b from {M 0 , M 1 } to get a ciphertext CT and use the Test algorithm to output M b is M 0 or M 1 . If we only want to construct a CP-ABEET scheme which is IND-CPA secure in random oracle model, we can add some hash functions to construct a secure CP-ABEET scheme. However, to construct an IND-CPA secure CP-ABEET in the standard model is not easy. This is our future work.
V. CONCLUSION
IBEET and ABEET are important cryptographic schemes to solve the searching encrypted data in cloud computing. They not only have the functionality of decryption, but also can compare the ciphertexts to determine whether the corresponding plaintexts are the same or not. However, some of the constructions have been omitted that the adversary could get the trapdoors in their security models, and that caused the schemes to be not secure. We analyzed the security of two schemes in this paper. We firstly proved that the IBEET scheme wasn't one-way under chosen ciphertext attack and gave some idea to improve the scheme. Then we proved that the CP-ABEET scheme wasn't indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attack in the standard model. 
